The Price of Blood
The Price of Blood : Syria’s Alawites and the Cost of Power
After decades of repression and unscrupulous authoritarianism, the popular upheavals of December 2024 across Syria put an end to the long-standing Assad regime and its intrinsic Alawite dominance. However, this change of political scenery was far from ensuring stability. The power-vacuum following Bashar al-Assad’s fall in fact awoke long-simmering sectarian tensions, giving way to targeted violence against the Alawite community. By March 2025, reports surfaced about widespread killings, forced displacements and retaliatory attacks, with over 3,000 Alawites killed in what some experts fear could be the beginning of sectarian cleansing. These events have sparked international condemnation, with calls for sanctions from both the new Syrian government and international powers against those responsible. This wave of violence however deserves to be observed with scrutiny - it doesn’t only represent an episode of post-war vengeance - rather, it reveals a deep-rooted issue in Syria’s sectarian history. The Alawite minority, long seen as the backbone of Assad’s rule, was both privileged and resented during his decades of power. Now, with a new Sunni-dominated leadership emerging, questions of retribution, reconciliation, and power-sharing have become central to Syria’s fragile transition. At the heart of this crisis lies a fundamental question : how do the recent killings of Alawites in Syria reflect the broader sectarian and geopolitical struggles in the post-Assad era, and what are the implications for Syria’s future stability and regional power dynamics ? Not to mention these killings have also reshaped regional dynamics. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah - longtime allies of the Alawites - have expressed concerns, while Turkey and Gulf states, which backed the Sunni opposition, are silently but closely observing the current shift in power. Meanwhile, Western nations are weighing diplomatic recognition of Syria’s new rulers against fears of escalating sectarian bloodshed. In this article, we will explore a double dynamic, with, on one hand, how these recent killings illustrate Syria’s internal struggles facing its post-Assad transition, and on the other, what these events mean for Syria’s relationship with regional and global powers.
Part I : The Debt of Power : How the Alawites Rose - and fell - with the Assad Regime
To understand the current wave of anti-Alawite violence in Syria, we must first retrace the long and complex history and evolution of the community’s relationship to power. Today’s killings aren’t isolated incidents, but rather the violent settling of a historical score - in this case, a blood debt tied to decades of dominance, repression and sectarian resentment.
Originally a marginalized branch of Shia Islam, the Alawites were concentrated in the Coastal Mountain Range of North Western Syria. Socially and economically disadvantaged, they faced long-standing discrimination from the consolidated Sunni majority, who viewed their beliefs as heretical. Their situation however changed under the French mandate of Syria (1920-1946), as colonial authorities heavily recruited from colonial minorities into the Troupes Spéciales du Levant - additional army branch to reinforce coercion - aiming to weaken pan Arab Sunni nationalism that was gaining influence against Western colonial powers. The military inclusion under French rule became for the Alawites a pathway to power, as the army became their route for social mobility and the basis of their later dominance in the post-independence apparatus.
The rise of Hafez al-Assad in 1970 after a series of coups marked an unprecedented shift. Notably, his “Corrective Movement”, a bloodless military coup perpetrated on November 13th 1970, installed a durable autocracy in which loyalty and sectarian affiliation were fused. Hafez, an Alawite himself, embedded his co-sectarians into Syria’s military, Ba’ath Party leadership and intelligence services. By the 1980s, 70-80% of security apparatus senior posts were held by Alawites, despite them representing only around 12% of the population. While many Alawites remained poor, the notables of the group became closely associated with Assad’s elite, forming what some scholars, for instance Steven Heydemann in his publication Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism, describe as a “sectarian security state”. When the Muslim Brotherhood launched an insurrection in Hama in 1982, the Assad regime responded with devastating force. The city was razed by elite armed units led by Rifaat al-Assad, the President's brother, in what is now known as the Hama Massacre. Human Rights Watch reports this armed intervention caused the death of an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 civilians. Though the uprising was claimed to be solely political, many Sunnis interpreted the massacre as sectarian repression by the Alawite regime. The memory of Hama would feed Sunni grievances and militant narratives for decades to come.
The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 accelerated the sectarian divide. As peaceful protests morphed into armed violence and dispersed guerrillas, the Assad regime heavily relied on Alawite-majority units and militias such as the Shabiha, reinforcing the idea of the Alawites as a regime-aligned sect. From 2013 to 2016, rebel groups including Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra launched offensives on Lattaquié province and the Jabhat al-Akrad region, targeting Alawite villages and paramilitary positions. These regions - traditional Alawite strongholds - became flashpoints of sectarian retaliation and fear. While not all Alawites supported Assad, the war trapped them between regime loyalty and existential fear of a Sunni-dominated post-Assad Syria, explaining why no opposition was ever expressed towards the regime in place on their account. Thus, as Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed in late 2024, Alawites not only lost their protector, but also their shield against long-held resentments. In the new post-Assad Syria, their perceived collective complicity has made them vulnerable to retribution, regardless of their individual political stances. The blood price is being extracted not just for Assad’s crimes, but for the narrative of power that included an entire community.
Part II: The Fractured Peace : Sectarian Tensions and Power Shifts in Post-Assad Syria
With the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria entered a new phase not of peace, but of uncertain fragmentation. While the formal machinery of dictatorship was dismantled, it left behind a country deeply divided among sectarian lines. Amid this upheaval, the Alawite community, once seen as a pillar of state power, has become a primary target of retaliation.
In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, reports emerged of Alawite neighborhoods in Homs, Hama, and the outskirts of latakia being attacked, homes torched, and residents either killed or forcibly displaced. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has confirmed deaths of over 3,000 Alawites since early March, many in what witnesses described as “organized retaliatory operations”, not spontaneous mob violence. Middle East Eye reports armed groups such as Jaish al-Sham and Ajnad al-Furat - Sunni Islamist factions having gained prominence in late 2024 - to have have explicit about their intentions to “purge collaborators” and “cleanse Syria of sectarian filth”, evidently referring to the once-elite Alawite minority. Some of these groups had previously operated in collaboration with more moderate rebel coalitions but have grown increasingly ideological and punitive since Assad’s exit.
Syria’s new transnational council, dominated by Sunni civilian technocrats and opposition figures, has issued repeated statements calling for national unity, non-sectarian governance, and reconciliation. Yet, on the ground, little has been done to stop the violence. An investigation done by Reuters in March of 2025 revealed that local authorities in rebel-held areas of Latakia province have failed to intervene in the face of Alawite expulsions and killings, with officials even going as far as privately expressing support for the acts. In many regions, new police or security forces are in fact either absent or complicit, suggesting a disconnect between the council’s official rhetoric and the reality in post-Assad Syria. This has raised serious concerns among international observers. The UN commission of Inquiry in Syria issued a statement on March 25 warning that “targeted attacks on the Alawite population may constitute crimes against humanity if left unaddressed”, and called on the transnational authorities to immediately protect minority populations.
Amid this chaos, ISIS remnants and affiliated cells also appear to be reactivating the eastern desert and northeastern provinces. According to a March 2025 report by the Institut for the Study of War (ISW), ISIS operatives have “capitalized on anti-Alawite sentiment to recruit new fighters and re-establish shadow networks”. ISIS propaganda channels on Telegram and Rocket.Chat have begun framing the Alawite killings as a “divine victory”, urging more radical “cleansing” operations. Analysts warn that if sectarian violence goes unchecked, it could provide the perfect pretext for jihadist resurgence, similar to what happened in post-2003 Iraq, where Sunni disenfranchisement fed the rise of extremist groups. Indeed, a recent suicide bombing in Tartous, claimed by ISIS-linked group Wilayat al-Sham, targeted an Alawite funeral procession, killing 27 civilians. This attack, along with several others in Hama and Salamiyah, signals a potential escalation of sectarian terrorism, thus not just local vengeance.
Part III: Watching it Bleed : Regional Powers and the Sectarian Fallout in Syria
The collapse of the Assad regime and the subsequent wave of sectarian killings have not only shaken Syria’s fragile internal balance - they have also had significant echo across the region and beyond, triggering a wave of cautious statements, veiled alignments and strategic reconsiderations. As Syria’s internal “debt” is paid in lives and blood, regional actors and international powers observe from afar, minutely calculating its price - in influence, refugees, and long-term stability.
The European Union, for instance, was very quick to condemn the wave of retaliatory violence against the Alawites, with the European Parliament calling for targeted sanctions against “individuals and militias implicated in sectarian crimes” (press release of March 27th, 2025). draft proposals circulating in Brussels suggest freezing assets or even banning travel for key Sunni militia leaders, even if they are affiliated with factions now nominally aligned with Syria’s transitional council. In parallel, however, European diplomacy is quietly re-engaging. Most notably, Germany announced in late March the reopening of its Damascus embassy after a 13-year closure, being the first EU country to do so. The German Foreign Office emphasized the move as “a necessary step toward monitoring the situation on the ground and engaging with all actors to prevent further violence”. This dual approach- condemning violence while normalizing limited ties- reflects Europe’s broader dilemma : seeking sustainable peace, without endorsing the perpetrators of instability.
On the other side of the regional chessboard, Iran and Hezbollah have expressed growing concern over the fate of the Alawite population. Though their strategic alliance with Syria was always rooted more in realpolitik than religious affinity, the Alawite-led regime was actually a vital conduit for Iran’s regional influence as well as for Hezbollah's logistics pipeline in Lebanon. On March 22, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued a rare sectarian warning, calling the recent killings “a dangerous campaign of ethnic cleansing” and stating that Tehran will “not remain indifferent to crimes against those who stood on the frontlines against terrorism”. Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, in a televised speech, also condemned what he called “the betrayal of Syria’s loyal people”, calling for “Alawite dignity to be preserved”. Moreover, there are already unconfirmed reports that Hezbollah units have quietly re-entered northern Homs and Western Qalamoun, under the pretext of “protecting civilian enclaves” - referring to significant Alawite-majority portions of these regions. This may signal a renewed paramilitary footprint, potentially outside the new government’s control.
The Gulf states, on the other hand, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have embraced the Sunni-dominated transitional leadership as a historic correction to the Alawite tyranny. A March Arab News issue reports Saudi Foreign Minister Fisal bin Farhan raised the new leadership’s “commitment to Islamic national unity” but refrained from commenting on Alawite massacres, a silence that speaks volume. Another key external player coming into play is Turkey, now more entangled than ever, with both leverage and a direct security stake in the transition. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, having hosted millions of Syrian refugees and long supported Sunni opposition faction, now seeks to shape the post-Assad order to ensure that Kurdish militias remain marginalized and that Turkish-aligned groups have lasting influence. Turkish media have downplayed the Alawite killings, instead of highlighting the “dismantling of the old regime’s terror apparatus”. Ankare has cancelled for restraint but stopped short of condemning the attacks, and is reportedly pushing for a buffer zone in northern Syria to house displaced Alawite civilians- not out of altruism, analysts say, but to contain refugee spillover and retain pressure point on the transitional government. According to regional expert Gönül Tol, Erdogan may see this moment as a “strategic opening to cement Turkish protectorates inside Syria while also projecting moral leadership over the Sunni world”. But this ambition walks a tightrope : too much sectarian tolerance could alienate Islamist allies, while too much chaos could destabilize Turkey’s own border.
Part IV: The Debt Unpaid : Syria’s Blood Price and the Fragile Road Ahead
As Syria stands at the edge of a long-awaited transition, the promise of a post-Assad era risks being overshadowed by the repetition of its darkest patterns. The violence against Alawite civilians, framed by many as justice for decades of authoritarian rule, may instead become a dangerous template for inverted repression, deepening Syria’s fractures rather than healing them.
The targeted killings of the Alawites last March threaten to entrench Syria’s sectarian geography. Analysts warn that if the transnational government continues to fail in curbing retaliatory violence, the country could see the emergence of de facto sectarian enclaves : Sunni-majority cities patrolled by Islamist factions, isolated Christian and Druze communities under foreign protection, and Alawite strongholds retreating further into the coastal mountains, cut off from the rest of the shattered nation. This trajectory would mirror the Lebanese civil war’s partition model; where reconciliation was only achieved after years of bloodshed and external arbitration. As Syria’s inner ethnic and sectarian borders harden, national identity becomes increasingly elusive and void of meaning. According to Syrian sociologist Azza Hadid, “what’s at stake is not just the future of the Alawite community, but the very possibility of a shared Syria”.
Despite repeated claims of unity and inclusion by the transnational leadership, few mechanisms for accountability or intercommunal justice have been proposed. There are no truth commissions, no national dialogue forums, and no concrete investigations into the recent massacres of Alawite civilians, despite their extensive mediatic and diplomatic coverage. Without actual restorative processes, inclusive governance risks becoming pure political rhetoric, divorced from the lived experiences of displaced or persecuted groups. This symbolic inconsistency could fuel further violence or drive marginalized communities into the arms of extremists or foreign protectors, as seen in the reactivation of Hezbollah militias in Homs and the growing ISIS recruitment narratives.
The international community, while vocally supportive of peace and human rights in Syria, faces a crisis of bandwidth. With Gaza still embroiled in violence, Ukraine locked in continued warfare, and global inflation fueling domestic political instability, Syria dangerously risks falling off the diplomatic relevance radar. The UN Security Council has debated dispatching observers or peacekeeping missions to monitor sectarian violence in Syria’s North Western regions ) but political gridlock, particularly Russian and Chinese objections, have so far blocked any meaningful resolution. European powers, overstretched and diplomatically divided, have prioritized border security and refugee containment over active intervention. As one senior EU diplomat anonymously admitted to Politico in March 2025, “the risk that Syria’s post-Assad moment becomes a silent Srebrenica, unnoticed because the world is looking elsewhere. The United States, while condemning the violence, has shown little appetite for renewed involvement, focusing instead on regional de-escalation and maintaining stability in Iraq and Lebanon.
If the current geopolitical trajectory holds, Syria may not emerge as the unified democratic state the new government claims to strive for, but rather as a mosaic of militias, enclaves, and proxy dependencies, with the Alawite community marginalized, embittered, and vulnerable to radicalization or foreign co-optation. This outcome is, however, evitable - the blood price can be altered, if not reversed, through serious transitional justice mechanisms, regional pressure on armed factions, as well as sustained international engagement. Without the latter, Syria may find that removing a tyrant is easier than removing the architecture of vengeance he left behind.
Conclusion
While the fall of the Assad regime sparked hope in many, it also gave rise to a complex puzzle to be solved in order to rebuild the nation, characterized by fragmented domestic groups, passive international actors, and bloodshed in the name of retaliation. The Alawite community found itself as the target of thousands of, at times systematic, killings. These acts of brutality committed against the Alawites mark a dark side of the transition to post-Assad governance, illustrating the larger sectarian and geopolitical challenges of the new regime.
The internal fragmentation of post-Assad Syria is reflected in the situation of the Alawite community. The official rhetoric including promises of unity and inclusion of the new leadership do not align with the reality on the ground, with few justice mechanisms implemented. The discrepancy between official statements and reality suggests a risk of extremist revival at a systemic level, an escalation from local vengeance. Similarly, the first steps of the new Syrian leadership on the regional and global stages have been turbulent. The Alawite killings prompted certain global actors to express condemnation and criticism, while others remained silent over the events. Reactions often reflect strategic interests, highlighting the plight of the Alawite minority within the international playing field. Thus, the violence targeting the Alawites raises concern over the future of the post-Assad project, suggesting further internal fragility and fragmentation and uncertainty on the global stage.
Overall, Syria has found itself at a critical point after the fall of the Assad tyranny, marked by different paths the country can follow. The Alawite killings hint at bloodshed that also marked the Assad era, representing one of the darkest trajectories the state can take. Through a more positive lens, the situation can also be seen as an opportunity for a complete turn towards real inclusion and institutional pathways for justice. For this to happen, the Syrian leadership and international actors must ask themselves, is blood really the price to pay for justice.
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